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Historical, Entrepreneurial and Supply Chain Management  
Perspectives on the Semiconductor Industry 
William Y. Jiang, Xiaohong Quan, Shu Zhou  
San José State University, Department of Organization and Management 
San José, CA 95192-0070 USA 
Abstract 
This paper studies the semiconductor industry from three perspectives: historical, 
entrepreneurial and supply chain management.  After a brief introduction, the paper begins by 
tracing the history and evolution of the semiconductor industry including the two seminal 
enterprises: Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and Fairchild Semiconductor.  Starting from 
the invention of the transfer resistor (transistor) by three Nobel laureates (John Bardeen, Walter 
Houser Brattain and William Shockley), the founding of the “most successful failure” in Silicon 
Valley, Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and the Fairchild Eight, the paper discusses some 
earliest entrepreneurial attempts in the industry and how these attempts influenced over seventy 
semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley, including Intel Corporation, National 
Semiconductor and Advanced Micro Devices. The paper then examines the industry’s developing 
business models, from the vertically integrated model to the integrated device manufacturing 
model to the development of the foundry model.  Finally, the paper looks at the industry’s 
growing trend of globalization together with its outsourcing/off-shoring and supply chain 
management developments. The authors believe that such a multi-disciplinary approach to study 
an industry provides valuable insights into the evolution and development of an entire industry 
and the approach can be generalized to study other industries to enhance understanding at the 




 According to reports from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), global sales of 
semiconductors were $255.6 billion in 2007 and $248.6 billion in 2008.  The 2008 global sales 
were negatively impacted by the world-wide economic turmoil, but were with only a 2.8% slight 
decrease despite the 2008 economic downturn [1].   Prior to the 2.8% drop in 2008, the 
semiconductor had an impressive seven-year consecutive growth [2].  In today’s world, 
semiconductor has permeated in every part of people’s life like nothing did before.  From 
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computers, automobiles, office equipment, iPods, iTouch and iPhones, entertainment devices and 
all home appliances, none can function without integrated circuit semiconductor devices.   Just as 
Intel’s corporate publicity literature asserts, “Tiny silicon chips... are changing the way people 
live, work, and play.” [3]  Intel’s recent announcement that Intel is going to invest $7 billion on 
state-of-the art chip manufacturing—in the midst of a worldwide economic recession—
demonstrates semiconductor industry’s continuing vitality and prosperity [4]. 
 From the vantage point of Silicon Valley where the authors are residing and working, this 
paper studies the semiconductor industry from three perspectives: historical, entrepreneurial and 
supply chain management.  In the following sections, this paper traces the history and evolution 
of the semiconductor industry including the two earliest companies in the semiconductor 
industry: William Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and Fairchild Semiconductor 
Corporation.  Starting from the invention of the transfer resistor (shorted as transistor) by three 
Nobel laureates (John Bardeen, Walter Houser Brattain and William Shockley), the founding of 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and its Shockley Eight (aka Fairchild Eight), the paper 
details some earliest entrepreneurial attempts in the industry and tells how these attempts directly 
influenced over seventy semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley, including Intel Corporation, 
National Semiconductor, and Advanced Micro Devices.  The paper then examines the industry’s 
developing business models, including the evolution from the vertically integrated model to the 
integrated device manufacturing model to the emergence of the foundry model.  The latter part of 
the paper looks at the industry’s trend of globalization together with its outsourcing/off-shoring 
and supply chain management developments.  Taking advantage of the three authors’ 
interdisciplinary expertise, the paper studies the semiconductor industry from three perspectives: 
historical, entrepreneurial, and supply chain management.  The authors believe that such a multi-
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disciplinary approach to study an industry, although uncommon in the extant literature of 
industry studies, provides valuable insights into the evolution and development of an entire 
industry.  This approach can provide a novel paradigmatic way of appreciating an industry and 
its vicissitudes from the industry’s beginnings to ensuing developments.  This approach can be 
generalized to study any other particular industry to enhance understanding of an entire industry, 
especially in this era of globalization.  This paper hopes to stimulate further studies of other 
industries across the entrepreneurial and business landscape such as telecommunications, 
networking, biotech, and Internet search engine industries. 
   
II. The Early Days and William Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory 
 Santa Clara Valley, located south of the San Francisco Bay and surrounded by the Sierra 
Mountains in the northeast and the Santa Cruz Mountains in the southwest, was nicknamed as  
“Silicon Valley” by Don Hoeffler, editor of the trade journal Electronic News, in 1971 and the 
nickname quickly caught on as a way to identify the world electronics mecca [5].   Silicon Valley 
has lived up to its name: throughout human history, the enhanced availability of information has 
created quantum leaps in human achievement.  From microwave radar to laser technology to 
integrated circuits to disk storage to microprocessors to the Internet and E-commerce, it all 
started in Silicon Valley [6].  One of the most important industries, which has served as the 
backbone of Silicon Valley and the indispensable “bread and butter” of all high tech industries, is 
the semiconductor industry.  Modern life and past and future economic development cannot be 
separated from the semiconductor industry. 
 How did the silicon-based semiconductor industry ever get started in Silicon Valley?  Let 
us turn the clock back to over half a century ago in the 1950s.   
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 While Leland Stanford and his founding of Leland Stanford, Jr. University in Palo Alto, 
California might have been the most instrumental in the late twentieth century phenomenon 
called “Silicon Valley,” and Frederick Terman might well be considered the “Father of Silicon 
Valley,”[7] William Bradford Shockley (1910-1989) could be considered Silicon Valley’s 
slightly wacko uncle [8].  Besides his other achievements and quirks, William Shockley has been 
regarded as the founder of the semiconductor industry.  Born in 1910 into a Stanford University 
professor’s family, William Shockley obtained his Bachelor of Science degree from California 
Institute of Technology (Caltech) and his Ph.D. in Physics from Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).  Working together with John Bardeen and Walter Houser Brattain and other 
research scientists in the Solid State Physics Group in AT&T’s Bell Labs in the 1940s at 
Whippany, New Jersey, William Shockley oversaw Bardeen and Brattain’s work when the two 
scientists co-invented the point-contact transistor.  Shockley then independently improved over 
the point-contact transistor [9].  Shockley, Bardeen and Brattain would soon share the 1956 
Alfred Nobel Prize in physics.  Meantime, what distinguished William Shockley from his co-
researchers Bardeen and Brattain was that Shockley moved to Palo Alto, California and founded 
in early 1956 William Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory, the world’s first ever semiconductor 
company to work on silicon-based semiconductor devices.   
 Located in Mountain View, California, William Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory was 
funded by Beckman Instruments as a division of Beckman Instruments.  The original site for 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory in 391 San Antonio Road, Mountain View, California still 
bears a historical marker, which reads: “SITE OF FIRST SILICON DEVICE AND RESEARCH 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY IN SILICON VALLEY.  THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
HERE LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SILICON VALLEY. 1956.” [10] 
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 William Shockley carefully recruited and assembled for his venture the best team of 
scientists and engineers at the time.  Transistors had already begun to replace bulky vacuum 
tubes in electronic products, promising new reliability and reduced sizes [11].  However, 
Shockley’s venture did not last too long.  As it turned out, the highlight of Shockley 
Semiconductor’s existence may well have been the champagne breakfast to which William 
Shockley treated his brainy young work force after being informed of his Nobel Prize [12].  In 
less than two years, he decided that his lab would no longer research silicon-based 
semiconductors.  The group of brilliant scientists and engineers began to defect and start their 
own company.  The most famous of this group consisted of eight prominent figures in the annals 
of the semiconductor industry, later widely known as the “Shockley Eight” or the “Traitorous 
Eight” [13], who will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section. 
 William Shockley Semiconductor, dubbed as “The most successful failure” in the history 
of science, technology, and business [14] is a prototype of Silicon Valley entrepreneurship, 
which, despite falling short of the ultimate goals, left profound effects on the history for the 
semiconductor industry and on Silicon Valley as a whole.  It may not be exaggerating if we say 
without William Shockley’s early entrepreneurial attempt, we would not have had the 
concentration of U.S. semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley and we would not have had the 
concentration of the top talent in this industry in Silicon Valley.    
 In evaluating and summarizing Shockley’s early attempt in the semiconductor industry, 
the following discussion of strengths and weaknesses can be said of this first semiconductor 
company: 
 Strengths: Shockley Semiconductor is the result of a watershed event (discovering the 
transistor) in the field of solid state electronics.  It is the first mover in the semiconductor 
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industry and the first company to work on silicon semiconductor devices in a geographical valley 
the Santa Clara Valley that would come to be known as Silicon Valley.  As Gordon Moore 
quipped, “Shockley brought the silicon to Silicon Valley.” [15]  Shockley Semiconductor 
brought together a remarkable team of top engineers from around the country.  The Nobel Prize 
winning discovery coupled with the best technology constituted the strongest R&D prowess in 
history of science and engineering.  It occurred during the best times to develop such technology 
with extreme urgency and demand in all electronic gadgetry from military for rockets, missiles, 
submarines, radar technology to all kinds of civilian use.  If Shockley hadn’t come to Palo Alto, 
there might never have been a Fairchild Semiconductor that in turn spawned over seventy 
semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley.  Overall, William Shockley Semiconductor 
Laboratory was an important crash course for entrepreneurship, from which the successful 
Fairchild Semiconductor was forged.  For that reason, William Shockley’s contributions 
continue to be indelible even from today’s perspectives. 
 Weaknesses: Why did Shockley Semiconductor fail with all these strengths?  Here are 
some of its fatal weaknesses: although William Shockley was a genius in physics, he was a 
failure in management.  Walter Brattain and John Bardeen rated Shockley outstanding at 
assessing scientific talent and defining a research aim.  However, Shockley had never run a 
company.  As some Silicon Valley historians comment, he “didn’t know the first thing” about 
management [16].  His intense distrust in his employees, his demeaning taskmaster and 
domineering management style irritated his top engineers including Robert Noyce and Gordon 
Moore.  At a time when the management field was developing in leaps and bounds towards 
behavioral science and the human relations model with all types of motivation theories as a 
reaction to Frederick Taylor’s less humane scientific management theory in the mid-1950s, 
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William Shockley was still treating his top scientist team only as mechanisms for pushing 
forward his scientific research agenda.  In addition, Shockley over-emphasized cutting-edge 
research consistently over commercial productivity.  All of these above factors contributed to the 
doom of his brilliantly founded first semiconductor company.  History proves that he would 
never live to reap any financial rewards from refining his Nobel Prize-wining invention.  Later in 
life, William Shockley devoted his life to being a Stanford professor and to his other endeavors. 
 
III. The Fairchild Eight and Fairchild Semiconductor  
 If William Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory served to usher in, and also managed to 
close, the first chapter in the annals of the semiconductor industry, the second chapter started 
with the Fairchild Eight (aka the Shockley Eight or the Traitorous Eight).  When the eight top 
researchers and engineers realized that William Shockley was abandoning research on silicon-
based semiconductors, the eight people group decided to leave the Shockley Lab and start their 
own company.  The famed Fairchild Eight was headed by Robert Noyce, Ph.D. in physics from 
MIT, who was later to be dubbed as the “Mayor of Silicon Valley.” [17]  The other seven 
included Julius Blank, a mechanical engineer from New York [18]; Victor Grinich, Ph.D. from 
Stanford, son of immigrant parents from Croatia [19];  Jean Hoerni, an immigrant from 
Switzerland and a Cal Tech chemist with two Ph.D.s [20]; Eugene Kleiner, an immigrant from 
Austria and a former manufacturing engineer from Western Electric, who would later become 
one of the most well-known venture capitalists in Silicon Valley [21]; Jay Last, native 
Pennsylvanian with a Ph.D. in physics from MIT, who would later become an archeologist and 
an art writer [22]; Gordon Moore, a native of San Francisco, alumnus of San José State 
University and of UC Berkeley with a Ph.D. in Physics from Caltech [23]; and Sheldon Roberts, 
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Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from MIT [24].   In addition to founding Fairchild 
Semiconductor together, every one of the Fairchild Eight would later on become famous in their 
respective ways after their collaboration in the Fairchild Semiconductor venture.  Their 
biographies should be written both together and separately one by one to provide further insights 
to Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurship and to render full justice to eight of the most illustrious 
careers in science, technology and business in American history.  That is a subject to be tackled 
independent of this paper. 
 Looking for funding on their own project, The Fairchild Eight turned to Sherman 
Fairchild’s Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation and formed Fairchild Semiconductor in 
1957.  According to Fairchild Semiconductor’s website:  
 The Fairchild Eight used $3,500 of their own funds to develop a method of mass-
producing silicon transistors using a double diffusion technique and a chemical-etching system.  
The silicon and germanium mesa allows manufacturers to produce multiple transistors on a 
single wafer.  That was a revolutionary breakthrough.  Fairchild Camera and Instrument 
Corporation invested $1.5 million and on October 15, 1957, Fairchild Semiconductor was born 
[25].  Once the company was founded, the Fairchild Eight demonstrated entrepreneurial spirit 
and executed their technical ingenuity with a vengeance.  Under that entrepreneurial 
environment, the Fairchild Eight pioneered new technologies and commercialized what they 
developed with speed and agility.  Robert Noyce developed the monolithic integrated circuit—a 
miniaturized electrical circuit on a fingernail-sized wafer of silicon.  Jean Hoerni took the idea a 
step further and put a collector, base and emitter all on one plane to form the planar transistor.  
Hence the modern transistor was born and so was a new industry: the semiconductor industry.  
Up till today, some fifty years later, the planar process is still the primary method for producing 
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transistors [26].  Just as San José Mercury News celebrated, “They [the Fairchild Eight] came, 
they saw, they conquered.  And they created an industry.” [27]  In addition to creating an 
industry, led by Robert Noyce, Fairchild also created what was to become a distinct work 
environment norm in Silicon Valley and in California: the Silicon Valley style of management, 
complete with casual dress code, laid back atmosphere [28], and cubicle-size CEO office.  
Hundreds of high tech companies in Silicon Valley have followed this management style in the 
last half a century. 
 While at Fairchild, the eight also made numerous revolutionary inventions in 
semiconductor manufacturing and processing, resulting in assembly line manufacturing of 
silicon wafers and semiconductor chips.  This process is used widely today by all major 
semiconductor companies in the world to produce billions of semiconductor chips for today’s 
use.  Fairchild was the first company that introduced the first commercially available integrated 
circuits and that quickly became one of the major players in the evolution of Silicon Valley in 
the 1960s. 
 Although Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, having gone through several mergers 
and corporate transformations, has survived even till today with nine thousand employees, its 
vitality as a major player in the semiconductor industry was long gone.  Within a few years of its 
founding, the Fairchild Eight began to defect.  Half of the Fairchild Eight (Hoerni, Last, Roberts 
and Kleiner) left to form their own company, Amelco, in 1961.  The other four also left a few 
years later.  In addition to the eight, many more of the Fairchild employees also left.  Those who 
left Fairchild formed many other companies, known as “Fairchildren.”  By 1980, nearly seventy 
Silicon Valley companies could trace their roots back to Fairchild Semiconductor [29].    In  
October 2007, Fairchild’s 50th birthday was celebrated in Silicon Valley by Fairchild alumni 
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from all over the country as well as by current semiconductor industry luminaries [30].   True to 
its advertisement annotation “We started it all,” Fairchild Semiconductor will be always 
recognized in history as one of the earliest and most influential entrepreneurial attempts in the 
annals of the semiconductor industry, which has hence brought immeasurable benefits to 
humankind.   
 
IV. Fairchildren, Fair-Grandchildren and Some Industry Icons 
 Former employees of Fairchild directly founded more than twenty semiconductor 
companies in Silicon Valley, commonly referred to as “Fairchildren,” including most of the 
famous name corporations in the semiconductor industry such as Intel, National Semiconductors, 
Advanced Micro Devices and LSI Logic.  These companies further spawned a few dozen more 
companies in semiconductor and in other high technology industries.  These companies, in their 
turn, can be dubbed as “Fair-grandchildren.”  The Fairchildren and Fair-grandchildren together 
make up a major proportion of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley and in the United 
States.     
 Among the Fairchild Eight, as mentioned previously, Jean Hoerni, Jay Last, Sheldon 
Roberts and Eugene Kleiner formed their company, Amelco (Teledyne Technologies Inc), an 
electronic components, instruments & communications products company.  Jean Hoerni also 
founded Union Carbide Electronics in 1964.  Then in 1967, he founded another company: 
Intersil Corporation, a high performance analog semiconductors company.  Julius Blank co-
founded Xicor, also a high performance analog semiconductor company which was later merged 
with Hoerni’s Intersil in 2004.  After co-founding Amelco, Eugene Kleiner in 1968 together with 
Hewlett-Packard veteran Tom Perkins formed one of the most influential venture capital firms 
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on Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley: Kleiner Perkins, later joined by Brook Byers and Frank 
Caulfield to become the present Kleiner Perkins, Caulfield & Byers.  Among the last of the 
original Fairchild Eight to leave Fairchild were Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore, who took 
Andrew Grove along in 1968 and founded Intel Corporation in Santa Clara.  Wilfred Corrigan, 
formerly Chairman, President and CEO of Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation, 
founded LSI Logic.  Jerry Sanders and Edwin James Turney, both prominent engineers with 
Fairchild Semiconductors, left Fairchild to found Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), which has 
remained to be the archenemy of Intel till this day.  When former Intel CEO Andrew Grove titled 
his management book as Only the Paranoid Survive, he was partly referring to Intel’s continuous 
and mortal paranoia of AMD [31]. 
 Of all the Fairchild former employees, the most famous are of course Gordon Moore, 
Robert Noyce and Andrew Grove.  They have become the icons and legends of the 
semiconductor industry.  Gordon Moore is truly a visionary in the semiconductor industry.  He is 
credited with the famed industry seminal tenet “Moore’s Law.”  In 1965, Gordon Moore 
predicted that the number of transistors on a piece of silicon would double every year—an 
insight later dubbed as “Moore’s Law.” Intended as a rule of thumb, it has been the guiding 
principle for the industry to deliver ever more powerful semiconductor chips at proportionate 
decreases in cost [32].  In 1975, Moore updated his prediction that the number of transistors that 
the industry would able to place on a computer chip would double about every couple of years 
[33].   This simple law has inspired Intel and its rival AMD to have kept that pace for almost half 
a century already since Moore’s Law was stated in Moore’s 1965 paper.  Up till this day, most 
semiconductor experts continue to uphold this law, although Larry Sumney, CEO of 
Semiconductor Research Corporation, in a recent discussion, says that around 2018 or 2020, 
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Moore’s Law will finally come to an end, because new technical hurdles will make it more 
difficult for companies to stay on the path of doubling the number of transistors on a computer 
chip every two years [34].  No matter how long Moore’s Law will endure technically, this simple 
principle and its predicted and realized exponential and exploding phenomenon has played such 
an important role in changing humankind for almost the last half a century. 
 Meantime, Robert Noyce, Moore’s closest friend and colleague, was credited with the 
invention of the integrated circuit and the creation of Silicon Valley management style.  Not only 
he was the absolute guru in the budding silicon-based semiconductor technology and innovation, 
Noyce was considered the nice guy and the employee-friendly executive.  He made Intel the first 
Silicon Valley company with a relaxed working environment, which would become the 
trademark of high technology companies in Silicon Valley.  Today’s famed Google 
organizational culture, characterized by sixteen-hour per day free meals, employees bringing pets 
to work in pajamas and onsite fitness centers with trainers, can be traced back to Robert Noyce’s 
innovative management style some forty years ago.  Today, Intel’s worldwide headquarters’ gray 
building with its characteristic blue trims, located in the celebrated address of 2100 Mission 
College Boulevard in Santa Clara, California was named after its co-founder Robert Noyce. 
 As the third employee (after Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce), Andrew Grove served as 
Chairman and CEO of Intel from 1987 to 1998, when the semiconductor industry and the 
computing industry rapidly developed.  Under Andrew Grove’s tenure, Intel changed from a 
manufacturer of memory chips into the world's dominant producer of microprocessors with its 
market value ballooned from $18 billion to more than $420 billion in 1999 [35], making it, at 
one time, the world's most valuable company, surpassing even General Electric Corporation and 
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Wal-Mart.  Andrew Grove remained to be the most well-known executive in the entire 
semiconductor industry until his retirement as Chairman of the Board in late 2004.   
 
V. Evolution of the Business Model in the Semiconductor Industry 
 In this section, we would like to examine the evolution and development of various 
business models in the semiconductor industry.  Throughout the annals of industry 
entrepreneurship and changes, the semiconductor industry has witnessed a progression of 
business models.  In general, this progression has resulted consistently in more vertical 
specialization in the processes of designing, developing, manufacturing and testing 
semiconductor products.  The vertical specialization in the processes further leads to the spatial 
division of labor at a global scale, which will be discussed further in Section V1 subsequently. 
A. The Vertically Integrated Model 
 In the beginning, the experiments of Bardeen and Shockley at AT&T Bell Labs, which 
led to the discovery of the semiconductor, were motivated by finding a lower cost and more 
reliable replacement technology for the vacuum tube.  AT&T commercialized its technology 
entirely through its own products, as semiconductor devices became inseparable parts of AT&T 
switches, exchanges and later, handset products.  
 IBM built its highly vertically integrated system 360 mainframe computer around 
captively manufactured semiconductor devices [36].  Captive manufacturing means that a 
manufacturing division is created specifically within the same company to provide manufactured 
products only for the same company.  For example, IBM’s semiconductor manufacturing 
division provides semiconductor processors only for IBM’s mainframe computers.  This was the 
initial dominant business model for semiconductors.  In order to make them, a company had to 
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create a captive subsidiary within a systems company and design the system and the 
semiconductors, and manufacture the semiconductor chips within the same company at the same 
time.  This vertically integrated systems model pioneered by AT&T and later by IBM was copied 
by leading Japanese companies such as Hitachi, Fujitsu, NEC and Toshiba and also by leading 
European companies such as Siemens, Philips Electronics, Groupe Bull and Olivetti.   
 For a period of time, the vertically integrated model appeared to have its major 
advantages: the deep knowledge of the design of the system helped in-house producers design 
products that would work in those systems.  Semiconductor design and manufacturing were like 
an enigmatic form of black art, and having control within one company over all links in the 
supply chain, that is, over the interactions between the memory chips and the rest of the system 
was a tremendous benefit.  As the semiconductor technology became more diffused and better 
understood, startup companies began to emerge and grow with newly developed business 
models, which were different from the vertically integrated model. One of the subsequent models 
is the integrated device manufacturer (IDM) model. 
B. The Integrated Device Manufacturer (IDM) Model 
 Different from the vertically integrated model, which design and manufacture 
semiconductor devices for computer systems in-house, the integrated device manufacturer (IDM) 
business model relies on commercial supplying companies to provide components in 
semiconductor devices used in the system.  The commercial suppliers do not make the final 
system, but serve as links in the semiconductor industry supply chain, providing semiconductor 
elements needed by other systems companies.  Intel is the most noted example of this newly 
developed integrated device manufacturer (IDM) model.  Its first products were memory 
products for IBM mainframe computers.  Later on, Intel invented the DRAM circuit as a 
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replacement for the core memory that IBM was using in its 360 computers [37].  Different 
industry players soon followed suit.  These commercial suppliers included other smaller 
companies like Intersil, Mostek, Signetics and National Semiconductor.   
 The IDM business model competed for many years against the vertically integrated 
systems model in order to overcome and outweigh the latter’s all in-house advantage, as 
discussed in the previous section.  The enigmatic black art of semiconductor design and 
manufacturing were gradually losing its mystery.  Over the subsequent period of time, the 
knowledge of making semiconductor devices would gradually diffuse and mature, greatly 
reducing the black art nature of the industry.  System architectures also became better understood 
and de facto interface standards began to develop that would enable customers to plug in 
memory modules and make them work seamlessly in the system.  As these developments took 
root, the vertically integrated business model’s weaknesses became more apparent.  Perhaps the 
biggest weakness was that the high fixed development costs of the capital intensive 
semiconductors could only be spread over the shipping volumes of the systems of the vertically 
integrated company.   
 By contrast, IDM manufacturers could ship their products to a wide range of customers, 
enabling them to reduce fixed costs.  This ability to aggregate volume across the market through 
serving many customers had another effect as well:  IDM companies could justify the addition of 
new capacity sooner than could many of the vertically integrated companies.  This provides IDM 
companies with access to the latest fabrication technologies, further enhancing their cost 
advantage.  Eventually, the combination of higher market volume and lower costs pushed most 
systems companies to abandon their captive semiconductor manufacturing efforts or to spin their 
manufacturing divisions off as independent companies. 
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 The IDM model gradually took over the industry from the vertically integrated model in 
the semiconductor industry.  One particular impetus for this shift was the fabulous success of 
Intel’s microprocessor business.  However, just as Intel’s microprocessor was reaching enormous 
volumes, yet another business model was beginning to emerge: the so-called fabless model. 
C. The Fabless Design/Foundry Model 
 The fabless design and foundry model is characterized by the total separation of the 
semiconductor design process from the semiconductor fabrication.  The fabless design firms rely 
exclusively on external foundries for the manufacturing of their designed integrated circuit chips.  
The separation of design from manufacturing, or called it the fabless design/foundry model 
emerged thanks to the ingenuity and tireless efforts of Morris Chang, the Founding Chairman 
and CEO of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and his colleagues at 
TSMC.  Initially, Chang thought that he could build other companies’ semiconductor designs as 
a stepping stone to developing the scale and capital equipment he would need to develop and 
manufacture his own designs.  Events soon caused him to change his plans.  The external fabless 
customers were lining up at the door, while he and his colleagues were trying to complete their 
internal designs.  Chang soon realized that it was time for TSMC to thrive on a new business 
model: the foundry model [38].  The following section will discuss this model further in 
connection with outsourcing and offshoring of the manufacturing functions of the semiconductor 
industry. 
 
VI. The Foundry Model and the Industry’s Globalization: Outsourcing and 
Offshoring of the Semiconductor Industry 
 17 
The next chapter in the annals of the semiconductor industry is characterized by the 
emergence of the foundry model and the industry’s globalization. 
From the early 1960s, the U.S. semiconductor industry started moving certain supply 
chain activities to foreign countries in order to take advantage of the relatively inexpensive labor 
overseas.  The success of the initial move, together with the receiving countries’ governments’ 
support and the availability of highly skilled labor in these countries have motivated the industry 
to shift gradually greater number of its  supply chain activities overseas.  By now the 
semiconductor industry has formed a fully integrated global supply chain with very high levels 
of outsourcing and offshoring activities.  
Three sequential activities are typically performed in the development and manufacturing 
of semiconductors: design, fabrication, and assembly/testing.  Assembly/testing activities, as the 
most labor-intensive and least-skilled functions, were moved offshore first, followed by the 
outsourcing of the capital-intensive fabrication activities to foundries, as was outlined in the 
previous section.  The most skill-intensive semiconductor design activities were the last to be 
moved overseas.   
With Morris Chang’s clairvoyance on the foundry model, TSMC experienced an 
unprecedented booming period in its corporate history.  Its foundry model was soon imitated by 
numerous other companies, including Chartered Semiconductor in Singapore, United 
Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) in Taiwan, and more recently, Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation (GSMC) in China.   
The foundry model also ushered in the era of semiconductor industry outsourcing, 
offshoring and full-scale globalization.  By now the industry is fully globalized with very high 
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levels of outsourcing and offshoring activities.  By definition, outsourcing is the strategy of 
subcontracting a business process, activity or function, such as product design or manufacturing, 
to a third-party company and offshoring is the strategy of relocating certain business processes, 
activities or functions from one’s own country to an overseas country.  These practices and 
strategies have allowed semiconductor companies to split manufacturing processes into multiple 
stages with each stage being performed in the most efficient and cost-effective way.  The 
combined characteristics of high value and light weight made it possible for semiconductors to 
be offshored to faraway geographic locations with considerable convenience and facility.  The 
semiconductor industry in the U.S. has taken full advantage of these global supply chain 
management activities, which have enabled the U.S. semiconductor industry to compete 
effectively in the increasingly competitive global arena, not only based on its superior chip 
designs, but also based on its low cost leadership strategy. 
In the following subsections, we will discuss the three successive stages of 
offshoring/outsourcing that have occurred in the semiconductor industry: offshoring 
assembly/testing, outsourcing fabrication, and now offshoring design. 
A. Stage One: Offshoring Assembly/Testing 
The labor-intensive chip assembly/testing functions were the first semiconductor 
manufacturing activities to be moved offshore.  It was none other than Fairchild Semiconductor 
that was the first semiconductor company that shifted its assembly/testing overseas in 1961 [39].  
Assembly, which typically involves cutting the wafer into chips, requires large amount of less-
skilled labor.  The abundance of low cost semi-skilled labor in Asian countries motivated 
Fairchild Semiconductor first to offshore its assembly to Hong Kong.  As the assembly process 
became more and more automated in 1980s, other factors--such as government support, land cost 
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and economic stability--became determinants in the choice of location for semiconductor 
assembly offshoring. Today, almost all U.S. semiconductor assembly and production activities 
are shifted offshore, with less than 5% remaining in the U.S. for prototyping and military 
purposes [40].  The low cost structure achieved by offshoring has enabled U.S. semiconductor 
companies to sustain their global competitiveness. 
B. Stage Two: Outsourcing Fabrication 
The second stage in offshoring/outsourcing of semiconductor industry is fabrication 
which is typically farmed out to overseas suppliers or foundries.  Fabrication-- the process used 
to create chips through a multiple-step sequence of photolithographic and chemical processing, 
requires substantial capital requirement for building a fabrication plant (commonly referred to as 
a fab) and acquiring expensive semiconductor equipment.   
The emergence of the foundry model can be seen as both a result of emerging fabless 
semiconductor companies in late 1980s and that of increasing costs of building semiconductor 
fabrication plants in the U.S.  These twin factors caused many integrated device manufacturers 
(IDMs) which manufactured their own chips previously to outsource their fabrication activities 
to overseas independent foundries.  The foundries were a more cost-effective way to aggregate 
market volumes to spread the large and increasing costs of semiconductor fabrication over more 
units than the IDMs could hope to achieve.  For example, Elpida Memory, Infineon and 
Motorola have outsourced to overseas foundries an increasing amount of their chip production 
[41].  
According to IC Insights, a market research firm, fabless sales of IC as a percentage of 
worldwide sales more than doubled from 6.1% in 1997 to 14.7% in 2003 and the fabless industry 
has grown from US$9.9 billion in 1999 to US$20.6 billion in 2003. The Fabless Semiconductor 
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Association (FSA) reported that fabless companies amounted to revenues of over $40 billion in 
2005, accounting for nearly 18% of the total semiconductor sales in 2005.  In 2006, Fabless IC 
suppliers secured 20 percent of worldwide IC sales. IC Insights further expects that fabless 
companies will command at least 25 percent of the total IC market in 2011 [42]. 
 On the other hand, the development of technology has also greatly facilitated the growth 
of foundries.  For example, the widespread adoption in 1980s of the metal-oxide silicon (MOS) 
manufacturing process enabled the division of labor in the semiconductor industry by providing 
a more standardized interface between the chip design process and the wafer fabrication process 
[43].   In the same vein, the growth of third party electronic design automation (EDA) software 
tools from companies like Synopsys and Cadence Design Systems has also enabled design 
companies and foundries to coordinate better the transfer of designs into feasible chip layouts 
that could be manufactured in high volumes with high yields. 
The justification for the foundry model is that it is a more efficient use of capital and 
enables semiconductor companies to concentrate on their core competencies.  The total cost of 
building a new fab has skyrocketed to close to $4 billion.  As the fab capital outlay increases, 
only the largest and most successful semiconductor companies will be able to build new fabs.  
More and more companies in the industry have decided to outsource the manufacturing portion 
of their chip products to foundries.  As a result they must negotiate for whatever capacity their 
foundry partner(s) can arrange for them.  Having an outside supplier to perform the fab function 
help U.S. semiconductor companies reduce capital investment and expand sales during periods 
when such capacity expansion cannot be financed.  The resources freed up by outsourcing are 
invested in company’s core competencies, such as design and innovation.  This benefit resulted 
in the rapid growth of fabless semiconductor companies during 1990s [44]. 
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Foundries have also expanded geographically.  As the demand increases, IDMs and 
fabless semiconductor companies have begun to seek alternative foundry suppliers to reduce 
their reliance on a limited number of foundries.  As a result, foundries have mushroomed 
worldwide.  For this capital-intensive process, the incentives for outsourcing are not only the cost 
of direct labor, but also the proximity to skilled labor, tax advantages, and favorable government 
regulations.  Asia, including Greater China, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, etc., with the strongest 
government support, accounts for the lion’s share of the worldwide fabrication capacity with the 
largest two foundries in Taiwan: TSMC and UMC. 
 1) The Role of Taiwan in the Foundry Model 
 Taiwan has played a key role in the development of the foundry model.  It houses the 
world’s two largest foundries–TSMC and UMC)–which together control over 50% of the global 
market in 2007 [45].   
 The establishment of TSMC in 1987 actually marked the beginning of the foundry 
business on a global scale.  According to VISI Research, TSMC was the largest contributor 
towards the six-year booming of the foundry business between 1995 and 2000, which accounted 
for more than 66% of the total pretax income of the entire foundry market.  TSMC continues to 
be the market leader and its worldwide share of foundry sales was about 40% in 2007 [46].    
 Establishing fabs in Taiwan is much less costly than in the United States.  As reported by 
Don Brooks, former CEO of TSMC, it cost about twenty percent more per wafer in the United 
States than it did in the environment in Taiwan.  “The depreciation is the biggest cost.  Utilities, 
(gases, power, etc.) is probably number two.  The third big cost is the labor cost (including the 
management and the engineers), which is less than ten percent of revenue.” [47]  The Taiwan 
government has provided preferential policies such as tax holidays to semiconductor firms in the 
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island.  These policies are being imitated in mainland China as well in order to lure firms there in 
the future. 
 However, the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is more than just these foundries.  A 
varied and rich cluster of semiconductor companies have emerged on the island that represent 
many specialized firms dedicated to different activities along the entire semiconductor industry 
value chain.  Among them are design houses, foundries, testing houses and packaging 
companies. 
 2) The Ascendant Role of China in the Semiconductor Industry  
 China has experienced phenomenal economic development since it started its economic 
reform and open-door policy in 1978.  Over the past 30 years, it has registered an average annual 
GDP growth of 9.88%. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty and the 
overall living standards have improved dramatically. With total foreign trade reaching US$2.55 
trillion for 2008 and a foreign exchange reserve of about US$2 trillion, it has emerged as a 
formidable global power in the world’s economic stage [48].  (Please add a cite, numbered [48], 
even though some popular and well-known data are presented here. right now, there is no [48]).  
Corresponding to such rapid and sustaining economic development, demand for electronic 
products such as mobile phones, personal computers, personal digital assistants, DVD players, 
etc. has increased drastically in this world’s most populous country.  Such increasing demand 
provides a major boost to the need for semiconductor devices.  This is a critical and unusual 
feature of the Chinese industry in that its domestic requirements promise to absorb most or all of 
the new semiconductor capacity in the current decade [49].  According to iSuppli data, the 
Chinese IC (integrated circuits) industrial revenue increased to $76.5 billion in 2008, from US 
$19.2 billion in 2003 [50].  China’s share of the worldwide IC market increased from 13.7% in 
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2003 to 29.2% in 2008, according to Gartner’s data [51].  This growing demand will require 
China to rely heavily on the import of semiconductor devices.  
 The Chinese government has realized the strategic importance of the semiconductor 
industry for its economic growth.  Therefore, it has devoted great resources to support the 
industry since the late 1990s.  With the low production costs, the sizable and fast-growing 
domestic market and the rising foreign direct investment in China, the Chinese foundry business 
has also started to flourish.  Major industrial players there include Semiconductor Manufacturing 
International Corporation (SMIC), Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (GSMC), 
Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Electronics Co. (HHNEC) and He Jian Technology and some others. 
The biggest foundry in China, SMIC, topped Singapore’s Chartered Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Pte. Ltd. for the third place in the worldwide silicon foundry rankings in 2005 
after TSMC and UMC in Taiwan, according to the rankings from Gartner Dataquest Inc. [52]. 
SMIC retained its third place in world foundry ranking in 2007, the latest ranking available [53].   
 Although Chinese fabs are still making predominantly 4-, 5- and 6-inch wafers, leading 
companies such as SMIC have started to adopt higher levels of process technologies to build 
larger wafer manufacturing capabilities.  For example, SMIC has built a 12-inch fab in Shanghai, 
in addition to its two 12-inch fabs in Beijing.  The larger wafer fabs are able to provide 
integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing service at 0.35um to 90nm and finer line technologies than 
the smaller-wafer fabs. 
 Emulating the success it has observed in Taiwan with its preferential tax policies and 
other incentives, the Chinese national and state governments are also offering a variety of 
favorable policies to entice semiconductor industry-related investment to China.  These policies 
include preferential value-added tax (VAT), preferential enterprise income tax, preferential 
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customs duties and import-related VAT, prolonged periods for the favored policies and limits for 
depreciation of equipment used in production, among others.   
 Although much attention has been paid to Taiwan and China since 2000, customers in the 
semiconductor industry are mainly from North America.  For example, about 65% of Chartered's 
revenue comes from North America and about 75% of TSMC's revenue comes from North 
America.  According to Dr. Kuo from Chartered, “China is still not in the stage using advanced 
technology yet.  After the equipment is fully depreciated in Singapore, then we move it to China 
to work on legacy business.  This reduces both capital cost and labor cost.  For foundries in 
China, their revenue stream is also mainly from outside China.”  Echoes of these views are heard 
from Dr. Rick Wallace, Executive Vice President of KLA Tencor, “China hasn't figured out what 
they are yet.  They are currently playing at the end of the product life cycle, utilizing partially 
depreciated equipment to service legacy businesses.” [54] 
 As the trend of globalization of the semiconductor industry looms large and rapid, 
countries in the Asia Pacific region such as Japan, Taiwan, China and India have identified their 
key strengths in this space.  Taiwan has focused on value added IC design, production and 
advanced IC manufacturing, while China has relied on low cost manufacturing and regional 
distribution.  India is also a frontrunner in this race with its expertise in the chip design and 
software development. Over time, each country will make efforts to leverage its advantages to 
the fullest under ever-changing market and competitive dynamics.  
C. Stage Three: Offshoring Design 
In recent years, besides offshoring assembly and outsourcing fabrication, U.S. 
semiconductor companies have also been increasingly shifting chip design jobs offshore. This 
skill-intensive process has mainly been kept in-house mainly because the U.S.-- especially 
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Silicon Valley--possesses most of the highly skilled design engineer brain power.  However, 
current trends indicate that, increasingly, several countries in Asia, such as China, Taiwan and 
India have witnessed growing number of top-ranked design engineers and have offered strong 
government sponsorship and incentives to design houses.  As a result, they have recently been 
quite successful in attracting semiconductor design processes to their own land. 
Outsourcing and offshoring have provided numerous benefits to the U.S. semiconductor 
industry.  They have helped semiconductor companies to focus their core competencies, take 
advantage of expertise and skills in other parts of the world and further create and sustain 
competitive advantages in the global semiconductor market.  The global supply chain had also 
provided more opportunities for U.S. semiconductor industry to capture a greater share of the 
global consumer market.  Outsourcing and offshoring practices have also contributed to the high 
sale growth when domestic revenues do not increase at a desired clip. 
Outsourcing and offshoring do have their share of drawbacks as well.  A geographically 
dispersed supply chain is likely to be exposed to different kinds of global risks, including 
economic, political, and business risks, thus making the management of the supply chain a 
formidably difficult task.  According to a survey by Industry Directions Inc. and the Electronics 
Supply Chain Association (ESCA), the prevalence of outsourcing in electronics has resulted in 
companies losing control and visibility across their extended supply chain, creating increased 
risks to both the outsourcers (original equipment manufacturers and the fabless semiconductor 
companies) and service providers [55].  Therefore, outsourcing and offshoring, while greatly 
beneficial to the U.S. semiconductor industry, also present numerous challenges in terms of 
efficiently managing and controlling the semiconductor supply chain.  
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Global supply chain management strategies have helped the U.S. semiconductor 
companies gain their competitive advantage in the intensive international competition.  The 
semiconductor industry, as one of the pioneers to invest in successive stages of outsourcing and 
offshore activities, has contributed to the development of supply chain management studies.  In 
addition, the semiconductor industry, as the first industry to reply heavily on global supply chain 
management earlier than other high technology industries, has benefited greatly from the global 
supply chain management.  It has demonstrated a good example of using global supply chain 
activities and, in its turn, has promoted the development of global supply chain activities for 
other industries. 
   
VII. Summary 
 In conclusion, this paper has achieved what it set out to do: presenting 1) two earliest 
companies in the semiconductor industry: Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory and its 
characteristics; 2) the Fairchild Semiconductor and the Fairchild Eight; 3) some semiconductor 
industry icons; 4) the semiconductor industry’s evolving models; and 5) the industry’s 
globalization, outsourcing/offshoring and supply chain management.  Future research will 
examine the industry in a more in-depth manner and will provide prognoses of the future of the 
industry based on the current global economic and industry trends.  This paper has taken 
advantage of the three authors’ interdisciplinary expertise and studied the semiconductor 
industry from historical, entrepreneurial and supply chain management perspectives.  It has 
presented a new paradigm: a multi-disciplinary approach, to study industries in the era of 
globalization.  It is the evolution of the industry increasingly at a global scale that justifies and 
entails the three perspectives of the approach for the semiconductor industry.  It is believed that 
such an approach can provide valuable insights into the evolution and development of an entire 
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industry.  This paper hopes to have stimulated further interest in studies of other industries by 
using this new approach.  
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